



This is the published version 
 
Bates, Richard 2008, The politics of civil society and the possibility of change 
: a speculation on leadership in education, in Political approaches to 



























Copyright: 2008, Taylor and Francis 
 
 
11 The Politics of Civil Society 
and the Possibility of Change 
A Speculation on Leadership 
in Education 
Richard Bates 
THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
The idea of civil society first emerged during the Enlightenment in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. It was an essentially utopian aspiration for 
a civilisation in which individuals would live together as politically mature, 
responsible citizens, tolerant of religious, ethnic and cultural diversity, and 
held together by a social contract based upon natural law and the beneficial, 
civilising effects of commercial exchange, one of the consequences of which 
would be a reduction in gross inequality. As such, it rejected the absolutist 
claims of both traditional religion and the authoritarian state, envisaging an 
essentially republican politics based on the self-organisation of individuals 
in the pursuit of common interests under the rule of law. Civil society, in its 
various versions, was therefore seen as something separate from the state 
but beyond the domestic sphere of home and family-a society of associa-
tions operating in the public sphere in such a way as to articulate various 
interests into the political process. 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the idea of civil soci-
ety was discarded in political economy to the point where Hobsbawm (1994: 
139) could describe it as 'nostalgic rhetoric' and Margaret Thatcher could 
famously declare that there was no such thing as society-only individu-
als and their families. However, during the past two decades the idea has 
reemerged as a crucial concept in social, political, and economic controver-
sies. The initial impetus for this 'brilliant comeback' (Kocka 2004: 67) was 
its use in the anti dictatorial critique of one-party dictatorships, Soviet hege-
mony, and Eastern European totalitarianism mounted by Havel, Geremek 
and Konrad (Kocka 2004). It was also vital to similar critiques developed 
in Latin America and South Africa (Kaldor 2003; Comaroff and Comaroff 
1999). But its use is no longer restricted to such movements and is in wide 
currency in both left and right political movements as well as by liberals, 
communitarians, antiglobalisation activists, and social scientists. 
Kocka suggests there are three main reasons for the current popularity of the 
idea of civil society. Firstly, its emphasis on responsibility and self-organisation 
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appeals to those who believe that the interventionist state has reached its limits. 
Secondly, with its emphasis on discourse, negotiation, and understanding as 
opposed to competition, exchange, and individualism, the logic of civil soci-
ety presents an immanent critique of unbridled capitalism. Thirdly, it offers an 
emphasis on social cohesion as an antidote to the individualism and fragmenta-
tion of postindustrial society (2004: 67-8). 
In its contemporary form, civil society is argued to be at one and the same 
time a type of social action, a social sphere, and a utopian project. 
As a type of social action civil society: 
1) is oriented towards non-conflict, compromise and understanding in 
public; (2) stresses individual independence and social self-organization; 
(3) recognises plurality, difference and tension; (4) proceeds non-vio-
lently and peacefully; and (5) is, among other things, oriented towards 
general things (and) the common good. (Kocka 2004: 69) 
As a social sphere, civil society is constituted by clubs, associations, social 
movements, and networks that form 'a complex and dynamic ensemble of 
legally protected non-government institutions' (Keane 199"8: 6). 
As a utopian project, civil society is currently being advocated in the West 
as an antidote to both big government and big capital, and in developing 
countries as a political project of modernisation in the pursuit of democracy 
and civil rights (Ibrahim 1995; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001). Here the idea 
of civil society is defined in contrast to both the constraining authority of 
the state and the primordial authority of the involuntary bonds of family, 
village, tribe, and historical cultures (Zubaida 2001). 
However, there are significant differences in the politics of civil society. 
Emerging from the Weberian tradition is a view of a public sphere where 
various groups consolidate around particular interests and argue out differ-
ences in values and priorities that can be subsequently articulated into the 
formal procedures of politics and legislation. As Kim suggests, 
For Weber ... the most crucial issue in revitalizing a civil society is to 
preserve and magnify the elements of contestation under late modern 
circumstances. Modern individuals need to engage in various associa-
tiona I activities so that they can challenge and compete with each other 
in a concrete everyday context in which they will be constantly required 
to define, redefine and choose their ultimate values and to take disci-
plined moral actions based on their choices. (2004: 188) 
Contemporary commentators like Wolin follow this line of argument, sug-
gesting, for instance, that in modern society with its vast concentrations 
of power in governments and corporations the most desperate problem of 
democracy is ' to develop a fairer system of contestation over time, espe-
cially hard times' (1996: 115). 
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On the other hand, an alternative view emphasises the associationallife 
it sponsors as a mechanism for establishing social solidarity in the face of 
anomie and disorder. In this right-Tocquevillian view, 
associational life is frequently imagined in terms of communal conge-
niality and group solidarity: the civic virtues, in terms of civility, coop-
eration and trust. In the face of the alleged anomie and disorderliness, 
then, the issue becomes the recovery of this form of solidarity through 
a pluralistic associationallife, which, as an unintended consequence is 
expected to engender a more engaged public citizenry and a robust lib-
eral democracy. (Kim 2004: 189) 
These contrasting views of civil society are taken up in two further ideas: 
contestation in an autonomous public sphere and social solidarity through 
the development of social capital. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE AUTONOMOUS PUBLIC SPHERE 
The most important contemporary theorist of the public sphere is Jiirgen 
Habermas, who, in The Structural Transformation of the Public SphereJ 
argued the importance of civil society autonomy as 
a domain of our social life where such a thing as public opinion can be 
formed [where] citizens ... deal with matters of general interest with-
out being subject to coercion . . . [in order to] express and publicize 
their views. (1989: 105) 
Habermas originally conceived of the public sphere as a unitary arena where 
different voices struggled to articulate a 'public' view free of the constraints 
of the political power of the state or the economic power of corporations. 
Public institutions-especially the media-needed to be autonomous and 
free from political or economic coercion. They were the third pillar of soci-
ety, providing the arena within which 'public opinion ... is worked up via 
democratic procedures into communicative power [which] cannot "rulen 
itself but can ... point the use of administrative power in specific direc-
tions' (1994: 9-10). Social movements-such as the feminist, civil rights, 
and environmental-were argued by Habermas to be .the most significant 
contemporary contributors to the public sphere and the development of 
communicative power. 
His critics, such as Negt and Kluge (1993), however, argued that it was 
precisely the existence of these multiple social movements that supported 
the idea that rather than a single, unitary, public sphere, there were in fact 
many publics and multiple public spheres which constituted (or were consti-
tuted by) multiple cultures and forms of communication. In the same vein, 
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Gitlin (1998) raised the question of whether we should be talking about the 
'Public Sphere or public sphericules.~ 
Moreover, Fraser and Honneth (2003), in part following Felski (1989), 
argued for the idea of counter-public spheres through which marginalised 
minority groups articulate positions in opposition to those in the broader 
public sphere, attempting subsequently to move them towards broader 
acceptance and eventual articulation into state legislation. In many ways, 
these are arguments about how the public sphere(s) operate rather than 
about the existence of such an area of discourse, contention, and debate 
separate from the state and economy within which ideas and interests can be 
articulated (McKee 2005). But the intersection of public sphere ideas and, 
by extension, the public interest, with the diversity of contemporary cul-
tures, .movements, and associations is an important area of current debate 
(Bates 2005a; 2005b; Gray 2000; Touraine 2000). 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The importance of membership in cultures, movements, and associations is 
emphasised by the development of the idea of social capital. It is possible to 
see it developing out of ideas of mutual obligation outlined by such theorists 
as Adam Ferguson (1966 [1767]) and Adam Smith. Smith's most popular 
book during his lifetime was Theory of Moral Sentiments (1984 [1759]), 
which took as its starting point the desire of individuals for kindness and 
esteem. Such desire was seen by Smith as the foundation for associations 
beyond the family through which networks were established on the basis of 
trust. Such networks built shared norms and social capital, which in turn 
facilitated commercial activity and the growth of trade (Bates 1995; 2003a; 
Muller 1993). These three key ideas-networks, norms, and trust-form 
the basis for various approaches to social capital in its contemporary forms. 
Interest in the idea has recently been revitalised by three authors in particu-
lar: Bourdieu, Coleman, and Putnam. 
Bourdieu (1991; 1997) articulated the idea of social capital as analo-
gous to economic capital which, along with cultural and symbolic capital, 
combines to determine the social position of individuals. Such capital was 
argued to derive from networks of relationships in which individuals are 
embedded and which provide social resources through which they establish 
an appropriate place in social hierarchies. Although Bourdieu uses the term 
in a number of different ways, it is essentially presented as a metaphor-
one that allows social capital to be seen as capable of being accumulated, 
invested, and spent in ways analogous to, but somewhat separate from, 
economic capital. 
At the same time that Bourdieu reintroduced the idea of social capital 
to European social theory through his form of cultural analysis, Coleman 
developed a similar, but functionalist, analysis in the US. Emerging from 
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his studies of the relationship between educational achievement and social 
inequality, Coleman suggested that differences in educational achievement 
could largely be explained by differences in social (somewhat distinct from 
economic) capital. In this explanation, Coleman defined social capital as 
'the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social 
organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of 
a child or young person' (1994: 300). He saw these resources as networks 
of social relations that were essentially inherited along with economic and 
political networks, and which consolidated achievement across genera-
tions: 'the powerful remained powerful by virtue of their contacts with 
other powerful people' (Schuller, Baron and Field 2000: 6). 
Oddly, despite their mutual interest in social capital and educational 
achievement, and their collaboration towards the end of Coleman's career, 
they never acknowledged each other's work in their writings. This was pos-
sibly due to Coleman's treatment of social capital and its distribution as 
relatively unproblematic and 'functional' while, for Bourdieu, the distribu-
tion of economic, cultural, and social capital was the result of considerable 
effort on the part of elites to maintain their ownership of various forms of 
capital at the expense of the dispossessed. 
Perhaps the most popular and influential account of social capital in 
recent years is Putnam's, whose commentary on the decline of social associ-
ations in the US is outlined in his article (later book) Bowling Alone (1995; 
2000). The three key themes reemerge in his succinct definition of social 
capital as 'features of social life-networks, norms and social trust-that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objec-
tives' (1996: 56). 
In charting the decline of associationallife in the US, Putnam (2000) 
argues that trust and trustworthiness lubricate social life, and the reci-
procity they engender is the touchstone of social solidarity. This does 
not necessarily mean that all forms of social capital based upon trust 
and reciprocity are virtuous. Indeed, certain forms of social organisation 
(organised crime, for instance), may also depend upon quite particular 
social norms, trust, and networks for their effectiveness. But the interest-
ing thing about Putnam's work is that it is less deterministic than either 
Coleman's functionalist or Bourdieu's reproductionist accounts of social 
capital. It suggests, rather, that social capital is variable between commu-
nities and over time. 
This idea of variability is taken up by Fukuyama (1992; 1995), who 
associates trust as the dominant feature of social capital, with particular 
cultural characteristics. For instance, he attempts to explain the relative 
economic success of various nation states with reference to his assessment 
of their levels of social capital. Success, he suggests, depends upon commu-
nities 'formed not on the basis of explicit rules and regulation but out of a 
set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations internalised by each 
of the community's members' (1995: 9). Moreover, 'a nation's well-being, 
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as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive, cul-
tural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society' (1995: 7). 
This being so, Fukuyama argues, 'high-trust' societies, such as Japan, 
Germany, and the US, will inevitably be more economically successful than 
'low-trust' societies, such as China, Italy, and France, as 'high-trust' between 
managers and workers enables enhanced production. Indeed, the function of 
social capital in his account now becomes clear: the enhancement of produc-
tion through the minimisation of dissent. Or, more politely, 'the economic 
function of social capital is to reduce the transaction costs associated with 
formal coordination mechanisms like contracts, hierarchies, bureaucratic 
rules, and the like' (2001: 10). It would seem, therefore, that in order to 
be economically successful states should sponsor the development of social 
ca pitat in order to reduce social friction and thus, transaction costs. 
There are several major difficulties with this approach, but two are of 
great importance. First, there are considerable doubts as to its empirical 
validity, particularly given the rise of China and the very high levels of 
indebtedness of the US, the failure of firms such as Enron and Arthur Ander-
son, and the growing disparities between rich and poor, none of which are 
conducive to the formation of 'high-trust.' Secondly, like most functional-
ist accounts of social mechanisms, it entirely dismisses the importance of 
inequality and conflict in the contestation of existing distributions of eco-
nomic, cultural, and social capital. Despite these criticisms, another attempt 
to use the notion of social capital in this functionalist manner is articulated 
through the 'Third Way' movement. 
Advocates of the Third Way place considerable importance on the notion 
of social capital, seeing it first in economic terms and secondly as a mecha-
nism of mobilisation of the disadvantaged through 'social entrepreneurship' 
(Giddens 1998; 2000). Giddens, for instance, advocates networking among 
industry as a form of social capital that increases innovation and productiv-
ity (2000: 78££) as well as endorsing the capacity of 'third sector groups' to 
'offer choice and responsiveness in the delivery of public services' to the poor 
(2000: 81). Social capital from this perspective, therefore, seems to involve 
the sponsorship andlor cooptation of associations and voluntary groups by 
either the economy or the state. The interests of the economy are served 
by lowered costs of production combined with higher levels of innovation 
through networking. The interests of the state are served by more efficient 
administration of services combined with lowered levels of anomie and resis-
tance (McClenaghan 2000). These are not necessarily unwanted outcomes, 
but they do indicate the propensity for economy and state to appropriate the 
supposedly autonomous 'public sphere' for their own ends. 
Indeed, the 'Third Way' project of building social capital among the 
poor, whether of the First World or the Third, is considered by some as 
a convenient ideological evasion of the problems of the mal-distribution 
of wealth and power within and between societies. (Fine 2001) 
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More broadly, the difficulty with the definition of social capital as primarily 
concerned with the replacement of the norms, values, and social solidarity 
threatened by the pressures of globalisation and economic competition is 
that it obscures the contestation between various groups demanding civil, 
political, and economic rights and the redress of undeserved inequalities. As 
McClenaghan observes, in such analyses 
social capital "is used in such a way as to place the main emphasis upon 
social cohesion; an emphasis which gives the analysis a profoundly func-
tionalist and socially conservative bent in that it discounts community 
organization and mobilisation in defence of citizenship rights and the 
political articulation of rights-based demands which inevitably generate 
conflict, in favour of activities designed to enhance social cohesiveness 
and, by implication, social control. (2000: 580) 
THE DEMOCRACY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
In essence this is, therefore, a battle between the (private) individual and the 
(public) state, with civil society being the battleground on which individu-
als, through collective action, attempt to delimit the power of the state and 
where the state, through collective agencies, attempts to prevent the frag-
mentation of the nation. Baker, in his discussion of Havel's approach to this 
problem, makes the point succinctly: 
With Havel, then, the public and the private are intimately related, it is 
just a matter of how the relationship should be constructed such that 
the public is not allowoo to destroy the private (totalitarianism), nor the 
private allowed to destroy the public (atomising liberal-individualism). 
(2002: 149) 
The issue for Havel is not that either the public or the private should have 
primacy over the other, but rather that the private should be a 'holding 
area' of the self 'from which the self must necessarily emerge to act publicly' 
(Havel 1988 in Mische 1993: 245). For Havel, it is this emergence of the 
autonomous human subject into the public sphere that forms the basis of 
authentic public life-the democracy of civil society (1985, 1988). 
In this view, Havel is close to Arendt (1958a; 1963), who argues that 'the 
political realm rises directly out of acting together, the "sharing of words 
and deeds'" (1958b: 198). But, interestingly, Arendt defends the idea of civil 
society against both the incursions of the state and the demands of commu-
nities based in national, religious, ethnic, or local traditions: 
Arendt's conception of the public realm is opposed not only to society 
but also to community: to Gemeinschaft as well as Gesellschaft. While 
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greatly valuing warmth, intimacy and naturalness in private life, she 
insisted on the importance of a formal, artificial public realm in which 
what mattered was the people's actions rather than their sentiments; in 
which the natural ties of kinship and intimacy were set aside in favour 
of a deliberate, impartial solidarity with other citizens; in which there 
was enough space between people for them to stand back and judge one 
another coolly and objectively. (Canovan 1985: 632) 
This is an important issue, for against both collectivist (totalitarian) and 
liberal (individualist) conceptions of politics, Arendt and Havel argue the 
importance of civil society as a ground on which both public and private 
interests can be articulated without the dominance of one over the other; a 
view sjmilar to Habermas' account of the importance of an autonomous pub-
lic sphere discussed earlier. As Baker argues, in Arendt and Havel's view, 
the individual's private sphere matters, but its preservation is not the 
sole end of politics, as in liberalism. Yet neither is the collective reified, 
as in more communitarian visions, since the public sphere is understood 
not as a thing in itself, but as that artificially constructed (though crucial 
nonetheless) space in which individuals come together. (2002: 154) 
But this raises immediately the question of how and under what con-
ditions individuals are to come together in the public sphere. While indi-
viduals may make claims as members of particular communities celebrating 
particular norms, values, and interests, the demand for recognition of the 
rights accruing to difference may well create friction with those claiming the 
primacy of alternative norms, values, and interests. As Olssen argues, 
pushing the principle of difference too far results in contradiction. 
While multi-culturalists and those who advocate difference want to cel-
ebrate multiplicity and a de-centered polis, the fundamental ambiguity 
results from the fact that respecting the autonomy of different groups-
whether based on religion, race, gender, or ethnicity-is only possible 
within certain common bounds. Central to this perspective is that the 
notion of difference must pre-suppose a 'minimal universalism' which 
in turn necessitates a certain conception of community. (2004: 186) 
Just what such a minimal universalism would look like is a matter of contro-
versy. It is, perhaps, easier to say what is disallowed than what is allowed. 
For instance, it seems clear that 
cultural minorities whose practices are based on deeply illiberal oppres-
sive relations based on gender, or sex, or any other basis of difference, 
cannot be tolerated and neither can group practices that fail to respect 
the fundamentally important principles of democratic politics, such as 
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respect for the other, a willingness to negotiate, tolerance, or the institu-
tional basis of deliberation or the rule of law. (Olssen 2004: 187) 
Such a perspective implies a middle ground between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, where individuals have the right to be respected as members of 
particular groups, but also the right of independence from the claims of such 
groups where they so choose: the principle of equal autonomy applies, as 
Touraine suggests, as the only universal principle that allows reconciliation 
between the public and the private. 
No multi-cultural society is possible unless we can turn to a universal-
ist principle that allows socially and culturally different individuals 
and groups to communicate with one another. But neither is a multi-
cultural society possible if that universalist principle defines one con-
ception of social organization and personal life that is judged both 
to be normal and better than others. The call for freedom to build a 
personal life is the only universalist principle that does not impose one 
form of social organization and cultural practices. It is not reducible to 
laissez-faire economics or to pure tolerance, first, because it demands 
respect for the freedom of all individuals and therefore a rejection of 
exclusion, and secondly because it demands that any reference to cul-
tural identity be legitimised in terms of the freedom and equality of all, 
and not by appeal to a social order, a tradition or the requirements of 
public order. (2000: 167) 
Or perhaps, as Taylor puts it more succinctly, 'the struggle for recognition 
can only find one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal 
recognition among equals' {J994: 50). But even if this is accepted as the fun-
damental, democratic principle, the question still arises as to how it is to be 
articulated in public institutions, and especially, perhaps, educational insti-
tutions. How is the democracy of civil society to be constituted in practice? 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
Two approaches to democracy, the classical and the contemporary, compete 
as an institutional basis of contemporary societies. The classical view was 
that democracy required participation in the life of the polis by active citi-
zens who collectively defined the norms, values, interests, and institutions 
through which their collective aspirations might be realised. 
A central feature of this classical conception of democracy, then, is 
that it is a moral concept identifying a form of social and political life 
which gives expression to the values of self-fulfilment, self-determina-
tion and equality-values constitutive of the kind of society in which 
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all individuals can fulfil themselves by freely and equally determining 
the common good of their society. (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 40) 
This is not to say that any society has ever realised these principles in 
practice, but rather, that as an ideal type, such a conception of democ-
racy allows political and social institutions to be held to account against 
such criteria. The implications are that institutions arising from collective 
action must be held accountable for their embrace of such principles in 
their day-to-day practices. 
The alternative, contemporary, account of democracy is based on public 
choice theory. In this version of democracy, contemporary life is seen as too 
complex and vast for the active participation of all citizens in political pro-
cesse~. Rather than participation, choice is seen as the fundamental principle 
between rival political elites through periodic voting for political parties. In 
this 'realist' view, 
'political equality' means an equal opportunity to vote for leaders and 
'democratic participation' means exercising that vote at periodic elections. 
It thus takes competition between political elites-and not participation 
in decision-making-to be the essence of democracy and the criterion that 
allows the 'democratic method' to be distinguished from other methods 
of political decision-making. (Carr and Hartnett 1996: 42) 
Clearly, the 'realist' view of democracy has significant limitations in that 
political elites may present alternatives articulating differing versions of the 
'public good' between which individuals get to choose, but which may not 
articulate their particular interests. Moreover, as footloose capital begins to 
operate 'over and above' the institutions of the state, options offered at the 
state political level may indeed not bear significantly on crucial issues over 
which the state has limited control. As Baumann suggests, 
Having lost much of their past sovereignty and no longer able to bal-
ance the books on their own or lend authority to the type of social order 
of their choice, contemporary states fail to meet the other necessary 
condition of a viable republic: the ability of the citizens to negotiate and 
jointly decide 'the public good' and so to shape a society which they 
would be prepared to call their own. (1999: 169) 
In this view, democracy itself is called into question as decision-making and 
alternative futures are removed from the political arena of the state and deci-
sions made by capital are represented as inevitable: 'there is no alternative.' 
But, as Dewey (1935) pointed out, such failure is not only of political but 
also of educational institutions. While he argued that the interests of individu-
als, even at the beginning of the twentieth century, had become increasingly 
privatised and depoliticised, thereby giving credence to the realist view of 
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democracy in which participation in the public sphere was regarded as increas-
ingly obsolete, Dewey also argued that the lack of participation in the public 
sphere was the result of the failure of social intelligence through the failure of 
educational institutions to provide the opportunity for the development of the 
knowledge that would allow full participation in the public sphere. Denigrat-
ing the intelligence of individuals who were excluded (women, blacks, and 
those who owned no property) from political participation by lack of knowl-
edge was not the fault of those individuals, but rather of the educational insti-
tutions that excluded them from access to crucial knowledge and skills. 
The indictments that are drawn against the intelligence of individuals are 
in truth indictments of a social order that does not permit the average 
individual to have access to the rich store of accumulated wealth of man-
kind in knowledge, ideas and purposes ... It is useless to talk about the 
future of democracy until the source of its failure has been grasped and 
steps are taken to bring about that type of social organization that will 
encourage the socialised extension of intelligence. (Dewey 1935: 38-9) 
For Dewey, prime among these social organisations was education-one 
that prepared individuals for active participation in the public sphere and 
the exercise of their democratic rights to participate in the governance of 
public institutions rather than the 'realist' option of simply choosing peri-
odically between platforms presented by political elites. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION 
If civil society is both an arena for collective action and a social process, as 
well as a utopian vision, one, moreover, that has a relative autonomy from 
the imperatives of the economic state on one hand and the cultural impera-
tives of traditional communities on the other, a crucial question is what role 
has education in preparing citizens for active participation in the public 
sphere? Increasingly, leaders in education are broadening their view of the 
purposes of schooling to include more than skill formation in the pursuit 
of efficient economic production, obedience to an all-encompassing state, 
or subservience to unexamined traditions. As Bottery (2004) suggests, 'big 
picture' issues are impinging on all of us in ways that cannot be ignored. It 
is worth quoting him at some length as his presentation of the current dilem-
mas facing educational leaders encapsulates the issues in a powerful way. 
This is indeed a critical time for education, and for societies in general. It is 
an age of rapid and far-reaching changes, which no longer occur just at lo-
cal and national levels, but which have profound effects across the globe. 
It is a time when we recognize that global warming is no respecter of na-
tional borders ... It is a time then we recognize that humanity continues 
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to contribute to global pollution, and yet still seems stuck within postures, 
both political and economic, which prevent this issue from being properly 
addressed. It is also a time of great paradox, when massive standardiza-
tions of global culture contrast with the easy availability of varied cultures 
and beliefs ... Perhaps most importantly, with the demise of fascism and 
communism as state-sponsored ideologies, it is a time when a version of 
liberal democracy is the only global political ideology, and walks arm-in-
arm across a world stage with an economics of free-market capitalism. 
The results of this twin domination have been remarkable and striking in 
their extent and intensity. (2004: 3) 
Starratt, while taking a somewhat different approach to educational leader-
ship based upon the requirement of schools to develop ways of cultivating 
meaning, community and responsibility, also does so within the context of 
the transition of contemporary societies 'between early modernity and the 
later, more reflexive modernity' in a globalised world (2003: 55). 
Although taking a somewhat realist view of democracy and social capi-
tal, Rifkin has also argued for the reconceptualisation of both civil society 
and the form of education appropriate to it: . 
The new economic and political realities require us to rethink the mis-
sion of the civil society in the years ahead. The third sector is likely to 
playa far more expansive role as an area for job creation and social-
service provision in the coming century. The civic sector is also likely to 
become a more organized force in every community, working with, and 
on occasion pressuring, the market and government sectors to meet the 
needs of workers, families and neighborhoods. Thinking of society as 
creating three kinds of capital-market capital, public capital and social 
capital-opens up new possibilities for reconceptualizing the social con-
tract and the kind of education we give our young people. (1998: 177) 
Similarly, I have argued on previous occasions the need for a global perspec-
tive on administration (2002; 2003b) and curriculum (2005b), arguing, in 
Bottery's summary, for the work of educational leaders to be 'about more 
than the delivery and implementation of government legislation, curricula 
and testing, but ultimately to do with learning to live with one another, 
learning to support one another, learning to listen to one another, and learn-
ing to redress issues of equity' (2004:10). 
As Starratt suggests, in such processes the idea of community is quite 
central: not community seen as a restricted form of social solidarity and tra-
dition preventing autonomous individual decision-making and the claustro-
phobic condition of Gemeinschaft, but community seen as an active public 
association directed towards the solution of public problems articulated in 
the public sphere. In such an argument the relationship between education 
and civil society becomes central. 
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If civil society is that space between the private and the public, between 
the state and economy on one hand and cultures and traditions on the other, 
then learning how to use this space becomes a central task of education. But, 
as argued earlier, civil society is not only a space, but also a social process, a 
process that is focused on deliberative agreement or mediation: 
Civil society is not only a space but also a process of mediation ... 
Understanding civil society as a social process draws attention to how 
these arenas embody a more constitutive model of communication in 
which social and political realities, mediated through language, are in-
terpreted and achieve explanatory power in the minds of citizen-actors. 
As processes of mediation, these networks serve as links between citi-
zens and their understanding of the issues and institutions that confront 
their respective historical moments. (Murphy 2004: 84) 
Within such an understanding of civil society, the role of the school in devel-
oping skills of mediation in the formation of communities within the public 
sphere around issues of public interest is of central importance. Starratt 
articulates a similar view of the role of educational administrators in 'culti-
vating community.' Rather than being restricted to the development of com-
mercially relevant skills or the communication of 'virtuous communities' 
(Sergiovanni 1992) based upon exclusion and the replication of particular 
cultural traditions, Starratt argues for the development of a public educa-
tion focussed on areas of public policy, one that encourages the develop-
ment of community mediation around 
the major issues contested in public debate: ecological preservation; alter-
native energy sources; full civil rights for various groups disadvantaged 
by social and political structures; government regulation of global corpo-
rations; international agreements on investments in global economic and 
technological infrastructures; the ownership of the airways, the oceans~ 
the rainforests, the Internet; international responses to terrorist organiza-
tions; genetic engineering of food, livestock, medicine, human organs; 
immigration rights and responsibilities, to name a few. (2003: 90) 
Such a view has considerable implications for the administration of cur-
riculum, but also for the administrative and organisational structures of the 
school for, 'in the formation and building of community within the school, the 
processes by which a community governs itself, and the corresponding pro-
cesses whereby individuals govern themselves, are crucial' (Starratt 2003: 91). 
It also has implications for the administration and management of pedagogi-
cal processes, as Murphy suggests in his argument for deliberative education: 
Deliberative education is broadly conceived as instruction that utilizes 
varying forms of classroom deliberation and deliberative exercises to 
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enhance the democratic skills of citizenship and to increase understand-
ing of democratic practice. (2004: 74) 
Moreover, such an education not only shows students how to 'engage epi-
sodes of public controversy' but also how such inquiry 'makes accessible 
critical learning from the discourses of civil society, performances of public 
culture, actions of citizen groups, and the struggles of opposition and prac-
tices of deliberation' (Goodnight and Hingtsman 1997: 351). 
Such an approach to education focuses not only on the importance of 
preparation and engagement with civil society and the public sphere but 
also on developing in students the capacity for 'argumentative agency' that 
encourages in them the 'capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and 
strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially 
wider spheres of public deliberation' (Mitchell 1998: 45). 
This approach, of course, is supported by a long tradition of progressive 
education going back to Dewey, a tradition that has been somewhat muted 
during the twentieth century by the ascendancy of a factory model of school-
ing dominated by vocational skills formation in the service of the economy, 
and the reproduction of culture and tradition through particular forms of 
moral education (Bates 2006). However, the limitations and restrictions of 
these forms of education are increasingly apparent and require a shift of 
focus in the administration of education towards that area of autonomous 
activity that is called civil society. Such a shift of focus requires that educa-
tion become more than an unacceptable administrative activity (Touraine 
2000: 287), but one which serves both public and private interests through 
its engagement with civil society and the public sphere. 
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